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Recent Breaches › Analysis › Inside the ARTEX toolkit, and the US outage week

RBRecent Breaches · Appendix DDeveloping story

Appendix D: When sabotage looked like ordinary failure

Attacks that looked like faults or stayed hidden, attacks on networks of communicating devices, and claimed attacks never confirmed or with ordinary causes.

Appendix D of Inside the toolkit behind ARTEX, and what the US outage week does and doesn't show.

The main report describes one way an attack could pass for an ordinary failure: an intruder gets a foothold, learns the system, then uses the system's own functions so the damage looks like an ordinary equipment fault. This page sets out the documented cases behind that idea, and the cases that cut the other way.

No source we read ties any case on this page to ARTEX or to the US outages of November 12 to 17, 2026. The cases show what has happened before and how investigators told sabotage from failure, not what happened this month.

In short
  • Attacks have been mistaken for faults, and faults for attacks. Both are documented.
  • Where a case was settled, evidence such as logs, files and timing settled it, usually weeks to months later. The outage alone never did.
  • Devices that pass commands between machines, such as converters, modems, routers and protective relays, have been a repeated target.

How it works, in plain words

In the documented cases, sabotage that passed for a fault followed three steps.

  1. A foothold. Quiet access, often through an office network or an internet-facing device: phishing emails in Ukraine in 2015 and at a German steel mill, a misconfigured VPN (a remote-access gateway) at Viasat in 2022, exposed VPNs without a second login check in Poland in 2025.
  2. Months of learning. Six months or more in Ukraine in 2015; almost a year before the Triton attackers reached a plant's safety system; up to three months in a 2022 attack on Ukraine's grid.
  3. Damage through normal functions. Operator software opening breakers, management commands sent to modems, standard industrial commands sent to heating controllers. So the symptom looked ordinary: a safety trip, a dropped connection, broken machines, wrong readings.

The evidence that told sabotage from failure is listed at the end of this page. Where it never appeared, early claims of an attack fell apart.

Attacks that looked like faults or stayed hidden

Stuxnet: broken centrifuges in Iran (found in 2010)

Malware reprogrammed the Siemens controllers that ran uranium-enrichment centrifuges at Natanz and drove their motors outside safe speeds, Symantec found. It replayed a 21-second recording of normal sensor readings, so nothing looked wrong.

  • How it first looked: machines wearing out. The Institute for Science and International Security found in December 2010 that Iran had replaced about 1,000 centrifuges of a model that breaks relatively often. Ralph Langner later wrote in Foreign Policy that the damage was meant "to be disguised as reliability problems."
  • How it came out: the antivirus firm VirusBlokAda reported the malware on June 17, 2010, and Symantec says it had existed at least a year before. Its sabotage purpose was worked out between late 2010 and February 2011.

Triton: a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia (2017)

Attackers reprogrammed Schneider Electric Triconex safety controllers, which shut a plant down safely when something goes wrong, FireEye reported in December 2017. Some controllers "entered a failed safe state," tripping the plant.

  • How it first looked: the June 2017 outage "was mistakenly attributed to a mechanical glitch," MIT Technology Review reported. Schneider specialists took the controller to their lab and found nothing terribly unusual, E&E News reported.
  • How it came out: a second trip on August 4, about two months later, led investigators to unusual communications beaconing out of the plant's IT network (E&E News). Mandiant later said the attackers had been inside for almost a year before reaching the safety system, using ordinary admin tools during off-hours.
  • A caution: FireEye assessed, with moderate confidence, that the shutdowns were an accidental side effect, not the goal.

A German steel mill (reported in 2014)

Attackers used phishing to get into a steel mill's office network and moved into production, Germany's cyber agency BSI said in its 2014 annual report, PCWorld reported. Components and whole systems "started to fail frequently," and a blast furnace could not be shut down in a controlled way, causing "massive damage." BSI named neither the plant, the attacker nor the date.

Maroochy Shire sewage, Australia (2000)

A former contractor sent false data and commands by two-way radio, set the frequencies of the council's repeater stations and released 800,000 liters of raw sewage, according to MITRE. The intruder disabled alarms at four pumping stations and altered data so stations failed or misbehaved.

Police found radio and computer equipment in the intruder's car on April 23, 2000, about two months after the first incidents; The Register counted at least 46 attempts. Accounts that staff first blamed equipment faults appear only in secondary summaries we could not check, so we do not rely on them.

Firewall reboots at a US renewable-energy operator (2019)

On March 5, 2019 (Utility Dive), an attacker exploited a known firewall flaw to force "unexpected reboots" at a US renewable generation operator, said NERC, which sets reliability rules for North America's grid. Over about 10 hours, links between sites and the control center dropped for under five minutes at a time, with "no impact to generation."

  • How it came out: "Seeing several of these outages at different sites raised suspicion," NERC wrote. The firewall maker's log review found an outside party behind the reboots, and a firmware fix followed.
  • The other side: the same report cites an earlier NERC lesson on a self-inflicted network "broadcast storm" with symptoms similar to a denial-of-service attack.

FrostyGoop: heating lost in Lviv, Ukraine (January 2024)

Over 600 apartment buildings lost heating in sub-zero temperatures, and repairs took almost two days, Dragos reported. The attackers did not destroy the heating controllers; they made them "report inaccurate measurements," using a standard industrial protocol, Modbus TCP.

Access possibly began months earlier through a flaw in an internet-facing router. Ukraine's SBU security service investigated, and Dragos published in July 2024, about six months after the attack.

A US water utility's "system malfunction" (January 2024)

On January 17 and 18, 2024, a Telegram channel called CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn posted videos claiming to manipulate controls at Polish and US water utilities. About two weeks later a local official confirmed a "system malfunction" that overflowed a tank at one claimed victim, Mandiant reported, reportedly one of several incidents tied to remote-access vendor software.

Mandiant says it "cannot independently verify" the claimed intrusions or their link to APT44, also known as Sandworm.

Denmark's energy companies (May 2023)

Attackers compromised 22 companies running parts of Denmark's energy infrastructure, and several had to switch to "island mode," cut off from the wider grid, according to SektorCERT, the sector's security center. To the public it was "a completely invisible incident," because power and heat stayed on.

SektorCERT's own sensors caught the first wave on May 11, which used a Zyxel firewall flaw, and all 11 companies hit were secured that day. Its report came out about six months later and said Sandworm's involvement "cannot be said with certainty."

Kyivstar, Ukraine (December 2023)

An attack on December 12, 2023, "completely destroyed the core" of the mobile operator's network, Illia Vitiuk of Ukraine's SBU told Reuters, as The Moscow Times reported. Vitiuk said the attackers had been inside "at least since May 2023" and was "pretty sure" Sandworm was responsible.

It is here for the long, quiet preparation. We did not find Kyivstar's first public explanation, so we cannot say whether the outage was first described as a fault.

Attacks on networks of communicating devices

Many systems rely on devices that pass commands along: converters, routers, modems, protective relays (which cut power to a line when they sense a fault) and remote terminal units (which carry commands to field equipment). These cases show attackers going after that layer.

Ukraine's power grid (December 2015)

About 225,000 customers lost power on December 23, 2015, when attackers opened breakers remotely with the utilities' own tools, according to CISA and the E-ISAC and SANS analysis. It was not disguised, but it shows the method.

The attackers could stay "for six months or more" to study the systems, and wrote malicious firmware for serial-to-Ethernet converters, which pass commands to substations. Uploaded to several sites within a short time, it left them "inoperable and unrecoverable," and the attackers also ran a wiper, KillDisk, malware that erases data.

Industroyer and Industroyer2 (2016 and 2022)

On December 17, 2016, a transmission outage near Kyiv lasted just over an hour, SecurityWeek reported, summarizing Dragos. ESET found malware that switched breakers through standard grid protocols, "in the way they were designed to be used," and called its use in the outage "highly probable" but unconfirmed.

One module could make Siemens protective relays unresponsive. In September 2019, nearly three years on, Dragos researcher Joe Slowik argued the aim was to leave lines unprotected when power returned; coding errors foiled it, and Slowik called it "unclear" that damage would have followed, SecurityWeek reported. In April 2022, ESET said Sandworm tried a new version against high-voltage substations, and CERT-UA said it was prevented (CSO Online).

The operator's own software: Ukraine (October 2022)

On October 10, 2022, Sandworm caused a power outage by running a built-in utility of the grid control software, likely to open breakers, Mandiant reported. Such techniques "make it difficult for defenders to detect threat activity," it said, and the attackers had possibly been inside for up to three months. A wiper followed two days later, possibly to remove traces.

The outage coincided with mass missile strikes, but Mandiant said it lacked sufficient evidence to assess a link. It published 13 months after the attack.

Viasat's satellite modems (February 2022)

On February 24, 2022, "tens of thousands" of modems dropped off Viasat's KA-SAT network. Viasat said the attacker got in through a misconfigured VPN appliance, then sent legitimate management commands that overwrote key data in the modems' memory; it shipped nearly 30,000 replacements.

The UK Foreign Office said the attack began about an hour before Russia's invasion of Ukraine and disrupted wind farms and internet users in central Europe. It said the UK's NCSC judged it "almost certain Russia was responsible."

Poland's wind and solar farms (December 2025)

On December 29, 2025, attacks hit at least 30 wind and solar farms, a heat and power plant serving nearly half a million customers, and a manufacturer, CERT Polska reported. The farms lost contact with grid operators but kept generating, and the plant's security software blocked the wiper.

  • Relay angle: the attacker used a default account named "Default" to load corrupted firmware onto Hitachi RTU560 units, trapping them in a reboot loop. Default logins on protection relays were used to delete files they need, and firewalls were factory-reset, erasing traces.
  • Forensic tells: devices were hit in ascending order of network address, and the firmware named a version deployed at no affected site. Activity at the plant began between March and May 2025.
  • AI and attribution: CERT Polska judged one wiper script likely written largely by an AI language model and said it "cannot be used in attribution." It found infrastructure overlapping a group tracked as Static Tundra; Dragos named ELECTRUM, with moderate confidence.

IOCONTROL: fuel systems in Israel and the US (2024)

Claroty's Team82 described malware for connected devices "used by Iran-affiliated attackers," with one wave hitting several hundred Orpak and Gasboy fuel-management systems. The sample came from a system allegedly compromised by CyberAv3ngers, which Claroty says is believed to be part of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The report describes no outage.

Relay networks used for spying, not outages

Some state-backed groups hijack routers and small devices to relay their traffic and hide its origin. None of these sources attributes an outage to such a network.

  • Volt Typhoon: CISA, NSA and FBI said in February 2024 that these Chinese state-sponsored actors were pre-positioning in US infrastructure for possible disruption in a major crisis, routing traffic through end-of-life routers infected with KV-botnet malware, which Lumen also tracked. In October 2026 Lumen described another such network, Silent Train, active from November 2023 to July 2026 (Nextgov).
  • ORB (operational relay box) networks: an address can stay in these China-linked relay networks for "as few as 31 days," so published clues go stale fast, Mandiant wrote.
  • Salt Typhoon: US agencies say these actors modify telecom routers to keep long-term access (CISA) and stole call records from multiple telecom companies (FBI and CISA).

Crude methods, real effects

Not every case needed advanced tools. Default passwords, missing authentication or exposed controls were enough.

  • Polish railway radio (August 2023): emergency stop commands broadcast over railway radio halted about 20 trains, The Record reported. Two men were arrested; a Polish official alleged the act supported Russia, which is not a finding.
  • Bremanger dam, Norway (April 2025): an intruder opened a valve fully, and the access lasted nearly four hours, Anadolu Agency reported. Norway's PST security service later blamed pro-Russian actors; Russia's embassy called that "unfounded."
  • Water-system controllers in the US (from November 2023): IRGC-affiliated actors using the name CyberAv3ngers reached Unitronics controllers with a default password or none, compromising at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in the US water sector, a joint US advisory said. The Record reported on November 9, 2026, that US agencies had earlier this year identified Shahid Kaveh as another name for CyberAv3ngers.
  • Supermarket fridge controllers (from October 2026): CERT-FR reported numerous compromises of Danfoss, Copeland and Dixell controllers and told owners to take them off the open internet and change default passwords. France blamed the October wave on Shahid Kaveh, which it says is a Revolutionary Guard unit (The Record), and Iran's Foreign Ministry rejected that (CNBC). The EU agencies' joint statement names no attacker.

The reverse: outages and claims that were not what they seemed

The opposite mistake is just as well documented. Some claimed attacks were never confirmed, and some large outages turned out to have ordinary causes. In one case, a real attack on office computers led a company to shut its pipeline as a precaution.

  • Oldsmar, Florida (2021): the county sheriff described an intrusion at the city's water plant by "a bad actor." The FBI later told CyberScoop it could not confirm a targeted cyber intrusion.
  • Curran-Gardner, Illinois (2011): a state report blamed a burned-out water pump on a Russia-based intrusion; DHS and the FBI "found no evidence of a cyber intrusion" (Krebs on Security).
  • FAA ground stop (January 2023): the FAA traced it to contract staff who "unintentionally deleted files" and found no evidence of a cyberattack, NPR reported.
  • AT&T (February 2024): the FCC found that a network element misconfigured during maintenance caused an outage that blocked over 92 million calls, including over 25,000 to 911, Fierce Network reported; we did not read the FCC document.
  • Colonial Pipeline (May 2021): a real attack on the office network, not the pipeline controls; the company shut the pipeline as a precaution so the malware could not spread, its chief executive told the Senate.
  • CrowdStrike (July 2024): a faulty content update crashed Windows computers; the company's preliminary review blamed "a bug in the Content Validator."
  • Iberian blackout (April 2025): ENTSO-E, the European grid operators' body, found "a combination of many interacting factors," including gaps in voltage control; the page we read does not mention a cyberattack.
  • Google Cloud, London (October 20, 2026): an underground utility cable fault cut power to a data center, and a design flaw and a misconfigured controller kept the backup generators from starting, Google's incident report says. It describes no attack.

Disputed: damage to Baltic Sea cables and a pipeline

These involve ships and anchors, not hacking, but show how long a "sabotage or accident" question can stay open. They rest on news reports; we did not read court or government documents.

  • Balticconnector (October 2023): after the Finland to Estonia gas pipeline ruptured, Finnish police recovered an anchor linked to the ship Newnew Polar Bear and said they would determine whether the damage was intentional, Al Jazeera reported. In August 2024 China acknowledged the ship caused it and called it an accident, The Maritime Executive reported.
  • Eagle S (December 2024): after the ship severed several subsea cables, including the Estlink 2 power cable, a Helsinki court dismissed the case against three officers in October 2025. In August 2026 an appeals court ruled Finland has jurisdiction and sent it back for trial, The Record reported; no court has ruled on intent.

Causes that changed this autumn

Among incidents we verified from late October to mid-November 2026, these four had a stated cause that moved from failure toward attack. We found none that moved the other way. They come from a curated list, not a statistical sample, so they do not show a trend.

  • Bank SinoPac, Taiwan (November 3 to 4): about 427 abnormal transfers left customer accounts through a new online-banking system. On November 4 the bank said outside hackers had exploited the vendor's security settings (Economic Daily News). Its earlier "system program anomaly" explanation appears only in headlines we could not check, so that first framing is weakly sourced.
  • Port of Santos, Brazil (from November 6): the port authority's systems, power and internet went down. Agência Brasil reported that the authority confirmed a cyberattack, while its president told Metrópoles "we're not sure" (in translation). Federal Police said the causes could not yet be stated.
  • US military commissaries (August to October): freezers failed at six or more commissaries in August. On October 29, Reuters reported, citing four unnamed officials, that investigators treat them as suspected cyberattacks; the Pentagon has not confirmed hackers were responsible (Task & Purpose).
  • Monadnock Community Hospital, New Hampshire (November 9 to 16): a week-long systems outage, with ambulances diverted, was described as a server outage until leadership called it a "cyber incident" (WMUR, Ledger-Transcript).

No source we read links these four to the US outages, whose operators have so far each given a non-attack explanation, set out in the main report.

What this shows, and what it doesn't

The pattern is real. Attacks whose first signs looked like ordinary faults are documented, from Stuxnet and Triton to the Lviv heating outage. Devices that relay commands have been targeted again and again: converters in 2015, protective relays in 2016, firewalls in 2019, modems and substation equipment in 2022, terminal units and relays in 2025.

It has limits. The confirmed cases were confirmed by investigation, usually weeks to months later, and most of the well-documented disruptive ones involved groups assessed as state-linked that spent a long time inside. The reverse mistake is documented too, including an FAA ground stop and a national phone outage.

It does not cover this month. No case here links an AI hacking tool, ARTEX or any other, to a disguised failure; the only AI data point is a wiper script CERT Polska judged likely AI-written, which it says cannot be used for attribution. None of it is evidence about the US outages either way.

What separates sabotage from failure

In these cases the outage alone never settled the question. These kinds of evidence did:

  1. Logs of outside access: remote logins, or a device "beaconing" to an outside server, as with Triton and the 2019 firewall reboots.
  2. Code that does not belong: firmware or programs matching nothing installed on site, as in Poland and in Stuxnet.
  3. The same fault in a pattern: one failure at many sites in a tight or ordered sequence, as with Ukraine's converters, Poland's devices and the 2019 firewalls.
  4. Readings that contradict reality: normal values on screen while the process goes wrong, as with Stuxnet and FrostyGoop.
  5. Clean-up afterwards: wipers or factory resets that can also erase traces, as in Ukraine in 2015 and 2022 and Poland in 2025.

Where none of this appeared, early attack claims fell apart, as at Oldsmar and in Illinois. For the November outages, the matching checks are under "What would settle it" in the main report.

Update log: This is a developing story. We'll add new findings here as the FAA forensics, vendor advisories and official root-cause reports come in. 18 Nov 2026: added "Where Anthropic's Claude and Mythos 5 fit", including whether restricting Mythos helped or hurt, the publisher's view and a skeptical reading, a key point, 21 timeline entries (AI models, the June 2026 US order, ARTEX's developer, related attacks, and the November 16 Optimizely and Coles incidents), and an item to "What would settle it". Later on 18 Nov: added the Director of National Intelligence's statements and House testimony, the FBI's clarification on ARTEX, the FAA's router pause and the state of its investigation, the Secretary of State's remarks, an unconfirmed report that fixes for AI-found flaws caused the outages, updates from Equinor and Optimizely, Visa's statement, earlier Amazon, Google and StepSecurity reports on ARTEX, a GAO report on AI chatbots, and 14 timeline entries. Last updated 18 Nov 2026.

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Sources

  1. France blames Iran, weighs sanctions — CNBC
  2. Joint statement on cyber incidents in refrigeration systems across the EU — ENISA, European Commission, Europol EC3, CSIRTs Network, EU-CyCLONe
  3. Alerte CERTFR-2026-ALE-012: refrigeration controllers exposed on the internet — CERT-FR / ANSSI
  4. Porto de Santos: systems still affected after cyberattack (in Portuguese) — Agência Brasil
  5. Hackers claim authorship of alleged attack on Port of Santos systems (in Portuguese) — Metrópoles
  6. Pentagon investigates series of commissary freezer failures (citing Reuters) — Task & Purpose via Yahoo News
  7. France blames Iran for fridge cyberattacks (Shahid Kaveh and CyberAv3ngers) — The Record
  8. China's Volt Typhoon quietly built another hacking network, new findings say — Nextgov/FCW
  9. Silent Train: Volt Typhoon operational framework — Lumen Black Lotus Labs
  10. Bank SinoPac: hackers exploited vendor security settings for abnormal transfers (in Chinese) — Economic Daily News (CNA)
  11. The cyberattack that put the world on alert (Triton) — MIT Technology Review
  12. FrostyGoop ICS malware intelligence brief (PDF) — Dragos
  13. Energy sector incident report, 29 December 2025 (PDF) — CERT Polska
  14. FAA outage traced to deleted files (January 2023) — NPR
  15. AA24-038A: PRC state-sponsored actors compromise and maintain persistent access to US critical infrastructure — CISA, NSA, FBI
  16. AA23-335A: IRGC-affiliated cyber actors exploit PLCs in multiple sectors — CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, INCD
  17. New Hampshire's Monadnock hospital diverts ambulances for a week after cyber incident — WMUR
  18. New Hampshire's Monadnock hospital diverts ambulances for a week after cyber incident — Monadnock Ledger-Transcript
  19. Google Cloud London zone loses power after utility cable fault and PLC misconfiguration — Google Cloud Service Health (incident Xs2XTHzAVC9YnafnPyzj)
  20. W32.Stuxnet Dossier v1.4 — Symantec
  21. Stuxnet's secret twin — Foreign Policy (Ralph Langner)
  22. Did Stuxnet take out 1,000 centrifuges at Natanz? — Institute for Science and International Security
  23. Attackers deploy new ICS attack framework TRITON — FireEye / Mandiant
  24. TRITON actor TTP profile, custom attack tools and detections — Mandiant
  25. The inside story of the world's most dangerous malware — E&E News
  26. Cyberattack on German steel factory causes massive damage — PCWorld
  27. Maroochy Water Services attack (C0020) — MITRE ATT&CK for ICS
  28. Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks — The Register
  29. Lessons learned: risks posed by firewall firmware vulnerabilities (PDF) — NERC
  30. NERC finds first remote hacker interference on US grid — Utility Dive
  31. IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01: Cyber-attack against Ukrainian critical infrastructure — CISA
  32. Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid (PDF) — E-ISAC / SANS
  33. Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet — ESET WeLiveSecurity
  34. Russian hackers behind Ukraine power outage may have sought more damage — SecurityWeek
  35. Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded — ESET WeLiveSecurity
  36. Ukraine energy facility hit by two waves of cyberattacks by Russia's Sandworm group — CSO Online
  37. Sandworm disrupts power in Ukraine using a novel attack against operational technology — Mandiant
  38. KA-SAT network cyber attack overview — Viasat
  39. Russia behind cyber-attack with Europe-wide impact an hour before Ukraine invasion — UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
  40. Poland power grid attack: ELECTRUM targets distributed energy — Dragos
  41. KV-botnet investigation — Lumen Black Lotus Labs
  42. China-nexus espionage ORB networks — Mandiant
  43. AA25-239A: Countering Chinese state-sponsored actors compromise of networks worldwide — CISA and partners
  44. Joint statement from FBI and CISA on PRC targeting of commercial telecommunications infrastructure — FBI and CISA
  45. Two arrested in Poland over railway radio-stop hack — The Record
  46. Norway security service says pro-Russian hackers behind dam sabotage — Anadolu Agency
  47. The attack against Danish critical infrastructure (PDF) — SektorCERT
  48. APT44: Unearthing Sandworm (PDF) — Mandiant
  49. Ukraine says Russian hackers breached telecom giant months ahead of cyberattack (Reuters) — The Moscow Times
  50. Inside a new OT/IoT cyber weapon: IOCONTROL — Claroty Team82
  51. Oldsmar water plant: FBI could not confirm a targeted intrusion — CyberScoop
  52. DHS blasts reports of Illinois water station hack — Krebs on Security
  53. FCC reports on AT&T's nationwide outage in February — Fierce Network
  54. Testimony of Joseph Blount, Colonial Pipeline, 8 June 2021 (PDF) — US Senate Homeland Security Committee
  55. Preliminary post incident review: content configuration update impacting the Falcon sensor — CrowdStrike
  56. 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: expert panel reports — ENTSO-E
  57. Finland says Chinese vessel's broken anchor caused Balticconnector damage — Al Jazeera
  58. China acknowledges that boxship caused Balticconnector pipeline breach — The Maritime Executive
  59. Finland appeals court revives case against Eagle S — The Record

Attributions to threat groups and methods reflect public reporting and, in some cases, unverified claims made by the groups themselves; they may be incomplete or later revised. Recent Breaches and GalaxyWarden are independent and are not affiliated with, and do not endorse, any company or group named on this page. This information is aggregated from public sources for awareness only and is not legal, security, or investment advice.

AIResearched and drafted with AI assistance from public sources and the developer's public code, then checked claim by claim against the sources listed. AI-assisted text can be wrong; corrections are recorded in the update log. Contact the desk to report an error.

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