CVE-2007-3010: Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
masterCGI in the Unified Maintenance Tool in Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Communication Server allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands.
CVE-2007-3010 is a remote code execution vulnerability in the Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Communication Server. Specifically, the masterCGI component in the Unified Maintenance Tool can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system. For organizations still running this telephony and unified-communications platform, the issue matters because successful abuse can give an attacker control over a core infrastructure server that often sits on internal networks and handles sensitive call and configuration data.
Public detail is limited to the CISA description and the CWE classification. Confirm exact product builds, fixed releases, and deployment notes against the vendor advisory before acting.
How it works
The weakness is classified as CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation). In products of this class, a maintenance or management CGI interface accepts input that is not sufficiently checked before it is passed to a command interpreter or system call. An attacker who can reach the Unified Maintenance Tool’s masterCGI endpoint over the network can supply crafted input that causes the server to run commands of the attacker’s choosing.
No exploit mechanics, payloads, or proof-of-concept details are provided in the available facts. Treat any unauthenticated or weakly authenticated access to the maintenance interface as high risk; the practical outcome is arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the process that hosts masterCGI. Confirm the precise attack surface and required access conditions in the vendor advisory.
Am I affected? How to find it in your systems
Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Communication Server is typically deployed as a private-branch-exchange (PBX) or unified-communications appliance in enterprise voice environments. It may appear as a dedicated hardware appliance, a virtual machine, or a managed service node on the internal network, often with management interfaces exposed to administrator subnets or, in misconfigured cases, more broadly.
- Inventory all OmniPCX Enterprise instances by consulting asset-management records, network-discovery scans, and voice-infrastructure documentation.
- Identify systems that still expose the Unified Maintenance Tool or any CGI-based management interfaces; note listening ports and whether those interfaces are reachable from untrusted networks.
- Compare installed software revisions against the fixed versions listed in the vendor advisory; the facts supplied here do not include version numbers, so do not rely on guesses.
- Review web-server and application logs for unexpected requests to masterCGI or other maintenance CGI paths, especially requests containing unusual parameters or originating from unexpected source addresses.
- Check authentication and access-control logs for anomalous administrative sessions around the same timeframe.
If you cannot confirm the exact build or patch level, treat the system as potentially vulnerable until verified.
How to remediate
The required action is to apply updates per the vendor’s instructions. Obtain the official security advisory and patch package for Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Communication Server, validate the package integrity, and install it in a controlled maintenance window. After patching, verify that the Unified Maintenance Tool no longer accepts the previously vulnerable input and that normal call-processing and management functions remain intact.
Beyond the patch, harden the management plane for this class of system:
- Restrict access to all maintenance and CGI interfaces to a small set of authorized management hosts or jump servers via network ACLs or firewall rules.
- Disable or remove unused maintenance tools and CGI scripts if the vendor documentation permits.
- Enforce strong authentication and, where supported, multi-factor authentication for administrative access.
- Ensure the service account running the web or CGI components operates with least privilege.
- Keep a current configuration backup and a tested recovery procedure before and after the change.
If you can't patch immediately
When an immediate update is not feasible, apply compensating controls to reduce exposure until the vendor fix can be installed:
- Segment the OmniPCX server so that the Unified Maintenance Tool is reachable only from a tightly controlled management network; block all other sources at the firewall.
- If a web application firewall or reverse proxy sits in front of the management interface, consider virtual-patching rules that reject anomalous or unexpected parameter patterns directed at masterCGI—tune and test carefully to avoid breaking legitimate administration.
- Temporarily disable the Unified Maintenance Tool or its CGI components if operational requirements allow and the vendor supports that configuration.
- Increase monitoring: alert on any connection attempts to the maintenance ports, on process-creation events spawned by the web or CGI service, and on unusual outbound traffic from the PBX host.
- Document the exception, set a firm deadline for patching, and obtain appropriate risk acceptance from system owners.
These measures do not eliminate the vulnerability; they only lower the likelihood of successful exploitation until the official update is applied.
If your data may have been exposed
Actively exploited remote-code-execution vulnerabilities on infrastructure servers can lead to broader compromise, including theft of configuration data, call records, or credentials stored on the system. Known ransomware use is not documented for this CVE, but any confirmed intrusion should be handled through your normal incident-response process: isolate the host, preserve logs and memory if feasible, rotate credentials that may have been present, and assess lateral movement.
As a further check, you can run a free exposure scan of your email addresses against known breach data sets to see whether associated accounts have appeared in prior public breaches, then prioritize password changes and monitoring for those identities.
AICompiled with AI assistance from public sources and published under our editorial standards.