www.indigoent.ca Listed by qiulong Ransomware Group: Ransomware Claim — What’s Alleged & What To Do

Patients and staff connected to a small ear, nose and throat practice in British Columbia may have had personal and medical information taken in a ransomware incident. Public reporting places the listing of www.indigoent.ca by the qiulong ransomware group on 30 May 2024. The number of people affected remains unknown, and the precise contents of any stolen material have not been independently confirmed. For anyone who has received care from Indigo ENT Group, the practical concern is straightforward: health-related data and identifiers, once outside the organisation’s control, can be misused for fraud, identity theft or further targeting.

What is known so far comes largely from the group’s own leak-site claim and limited public records. No official confirmation of the full scope has been published in the available facts, so the picture remains incomplete. The following account stays strictly within those facts and established background on the actors and sector involved.

Inside the incident

On 30 May 2024, www.indigoent.ca appeared on a listing attributed to the qiulong ransomware group. The organisation is identified in public records as Indigo ENT Group, a hospital and health-care provider headquartered in Coquitlam, British Columbia, Canada. The group’s statement asserts that it had been operating inside the network of “Indigo EST,” had exfiltrated internal files, and had taken “thousands of personal, confidential, and PHI, & PII data of patients.” It described the post as “the first warning” and referred to samples, though no sample contents are detailed in the available facts.

The facts state only that internal files were exfiltrated in a ransomware attack. Timing of the intrusion itself, the technical method used, the exact volume of data, and any ransom demand or negotiation are undisclosed. The number of people affected is listed as unknown. No independent verification of the group’s claims appears in the reported material, so the listing must be treated as an unverified assertion by the threat actor.

Who is qiulong?

Qiulong is a ransomware group that operates in the double-extortion model common among contemporary ransomware crews. Publicly documented activity by such groups typically involves gaining access to a victim network, stealing data, encrypting systems, and then threatening to publish the stolen material on a dedicated leak site if a ransom is not paid. Listings often include claims about the volume and sensitivity of the data taken, accompanied by sample files intended to pressure the victim.

In this case the group claims it stole thousands of personal, confidential, protected health information (PHI) and personally identifiable information (PII) records belonging to patients of Indigo ENT. Beyond that assertion, no further statements specific to this victim are recorded in the facts. Prior public reporting on qiulong and similar actors shows they frequently target organisations that hold regulated or high-value data, including health-care providers, because the combination of medical records and personal identifiers increases the leverage of a leak threat. The group’s claims should be read as self-interested statements rather than confirmed findings.

Who is www.indigoent.ca?

Indigo ENT Group is a medical practice operating in the hospital and health-care sector. It is headquartered in Coquitlam, British Columbia, and public directory information lists physicians including Dr. Dewji, Dr. Gooi and Dr. Mah. Contact details associated with the practice include a main office telephone number and the email address coquitlam@indigoent.ca. As an ear, nose and throat clinic, it provides specialised medical services and therefore routinely handles patient medical histories, diagnostic results, treatment notes, insurance or billing information, and standard identifying details such as names, addresses, dates of birth and contact data.

A breach involving a health-care provider is consequential because the data such organisations hold is both sensitive and long-lived. Medical records cannot be changed the way a password can, and they retain value for identity fraud, insurance scams or social-engineering attacks long after the initial incident. Even a modest practice can accumulate years of patient files, making the potential impact on individuals greater than the size of the organisation might suggest.

What was likely exposed

The facts name “internal files exfiltrated in ransomware attack” as the data types involved. The qiulong group further claims the material includes thousands of personal, confidential, PHI and PII records of patients. Exact file names, record counts, or a verified inventory of fields are not disclosed. Organisations of this kind typically store patient demographics, clinical notes, referral letters, imaging or test results, billing and insurance details, and staff or administrative records. Whether any or all of those categories were present in the exfiltrated set remains unconfirmed.

Because the group’s description is an unverified claim and no independent forensic summary is available in the facts, readers should treat the precise contents as unknown. The only firm statement is that internal files were taken; everything beyond that is either typical for the sector or asserted solely by the threat actor.

What's at stake

For patients, the primary risks are identity theft, medical identity fraud, and targeted phishing that uses real clinical details to appear legitimate. Stolen PHI can be used to open fraudulent insurance claims, obtain prescription drugs, or create synthetic identities. PII such as names, addresses and contact information can facilitate account takeovers or social-engineering attacks against banks, government services or other providers. Because medical data is permanent, the exposure window can last years.

For the organisation the stakes include regulatory obligations under Canadian privacy and health-information laws, potential notification duties to patients and authorities, reputational harm, and the operational cost of investigation, remediation and possible litigation. The facts do not establish negligence or any specific security failure; they record only that a listing occurred and that the group claims successful exfiltration. The practical consequence is that both the practice and the people whose records it holds face ongoing uncertainty until the full scope is clarified.

What to do if you're exposed

If you have been a patient or employee of Indigo ENT Group, treat the possibility of exposure seriously even while the details remain incomplete. Monitor financial and insurance statements for unfamiliar activity. Place fraud alerts with credit bureaus if you are in a jurisdiction that offers them. Be cautious of unsolicited calls or emails that reference medical appointments, test results or billing—attackers often use real details to build trust. Change passwords on any accounts that reuse credentials associated with the practice, and enable multi-factor authentication wherever available. Consider requesting a copy of your medical records so you have a baseline against which to spot later misuse.

You can also run a free exposure scan of your email address to check whether it has already appeared in known breach data sets. That step will not confirm or rule out involvement in this specific incident, but it can surface other exposures that warrant attention. Keep records of any suspicious contact and report confirmed fraud to the relevant authorities and your financial institutions promptly.

AICompiled with AI assistance from public sources and published under our editorial standards.