pln.co.id - PLN INDONESIA Listed by babuk2 Ransomware Group: Ransomware Claim — What’s Alleged & What To Do
On 31 March 2025, the ransomware group babuk2 listed PLN Indonesia on its leak site, claiming to have exfiltrated internal files from pln.co.id. Because the actual intrusion date is unknown, affected individuals should review any communications from PLN and monitor their accounts for unusual activity.
Ransomware groups continue to single out operators of essential national infrastructure, using data theft and public leak threats as leverage. Against that backdrop, PLN Indonesia, the country’s state electricity utility, appeared on a listing attributed to the babuk2 ransomware group on 31 March 2025. Public detail remains limited: the number of people affected is unknown, and the only description available is that internal files were allegedly exfiltrated. The listing itself is a claim by the group, not an independently verified confirmation of compromise.
For customers, employees and partners of a utility that keeps the lights on across Indonesia, even an unconfirmed claim raises practical questions about what may have left the network and what steps make sense next. The following account sticks strictly to the reported facts and established public background on the actor and sector.
Inside the incident
On 31 March 2025 the domain pln.co.id and the organisation PLN Indonesia were listed by the babuk2 ransomware group. The reported summary states only that internal files were exfiltrated in a ransomware attack. No further technical detail has been made public: the precise date of any intrusion, the initial access method, the volume of data taken, or whether systems were encrypted remain undisclosed. The number of individuals whose information may have been involved is likewise unknown. Because the sole source is the group’s own leak-site claim, the incident should be treated as alleged until independent confirmation appears.
The group behind it: babuk2
Babuk2 is associated with the broader Babuk ransomware family, which has operated since at least 2021 using a double-extortion model: data is stolen before encryption, and the threat of public release is used to pressure victims. Public reporting on Babuk-linked activity describes opportunistic targeting of large organisations, often those holding operational or customer records, followed by negotiation via dedicated leak sites. The group has previously claimed responsibility for attacks on entities in multiple sectors and geographies. In this case the only assertion specific to PLN Indonesia is the listing itself; no additional statements, sample files or ransom demands attributed to babuk2 about this victim have been reported in the available facts. Claims made on such sites are routinely unverified and sometimes inflated.
About PLN Indonesia
PLN Indonesia (Perusahaan Listrik Negara) is the state-owned electricity company responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of power across the Indonesian archipelago. As the primary national utility it maintains extensive operational systems, customer billing databases, employee records and supplier contracts. Organisations of this type routinely hold personally identifiable information of millions of households and businesses, together with technical data on grid assets and internal administrative files. A successful ransomware incident against such an entity can therefore affect both day-to-day service continuity and the privacy of a large population. The reported listing does not establish that any of these systems were in fact compromised; it simply places the organisation on the group’s claimed victim roster.
What data was at risk
The only data type named in the available facts is “internal files exfiltrated in ransomware attack.” No inventory of those files, no classification of their sensitivity, and no confirmation of customer or employee records have been disclosed. Utilities of PLN’s scale typically store customer names, addresses, account numbers, consumption data, payment details, employee HR files and operational documentation. Whether any of those categories were among the internal files claimed by babuk2 remains unconfirmed. Readers should therefore treat the precise contents as unknown rather than assume specific personal data sets may have been exposed.
What's at stake
If internal files were indeed taken, the practical risks include potential misuse of any personal or commercial information contained in them, targeted phishing that references genuine account or employment details, and reputational or regulatory pressure on the organisation. For individuals the concrete concerns are identity-related fraud or social-engineering attempts that appear more credible because they draw on real data. For PLN the stakes include possible disruption to administrative processes, the cost of forensic investigation and remediation, and the need to communicate transparently with regulators and the public. Because the scale and exact contents remain undisclosed, these risks are potential rather than proven; they are nonetheless the standard consequences that follow confirmed ransomware data theft in the utility sector.
Were you affected?
If you are a customer, employee or contractor of PLN Indonesia, treat any unexpected communication that references your account or employment details with caution. Monitor financial statements and utility bills for unusual activity, enable multi-factor authentication on related accounts where available, and consider placing fraud alerts with credit bureaux if you hold Indonesian financial products. Because the number of people affected and the exact data types remain unknown, there is no definitive public list of victims. You can run a free exposure scan of your email address against known breach data sets to check whether your information has already appeared in other documented incidents; that step provides a practical baseline while official statements from PLN or Indonesian authorities are awaited.
AICompiled with AI assistance from public sources and published under our editorial standards.
How this breach connects
More recent breaches
dukcapil.kemendagri.go.id (SIAK DUKCAPIL MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS OF INDONESIA) Listed by babuk2 Ransomware GroupMYPERTAMINA INDONESIA Listed by babuk2 Ransomware GroupINDONESIA TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (NPWP) Listed by babuk2 Ransomware GroupMYINDIHOME TELKOM INDONESIA by ( Babuk Locker ) Listed by babuk2 Ransomware GroupLatest breaches
Publicly posted by babuk2 — unverified claim, pending independent verification
Breach listings — particularly those originating from ransomware or leak sites — are third-party claims that may be unverified, incomplete, or inaccurate. A listing does not by itself confirm that a breach occurred or that any specific data was exposed. Severity is an automated assessment, not a definitive rating. Verification status is shown where available.
Attributions to threat groups and methods reflect public reporting and, in some cases, unverified claims made by the groups themselves; they may be incomplete or later revised. Recent Breaches and GalaxyWarden are independent and are not affiliated with, and do not endorse, any company or group named on this page. This information is aggregated from public sources for awareness only and is not legal, security, or investment advice.