Go Strictly Listed by akira Ransomware Group: Ransomware Claim — What’s Alleged & What To Do

Ransomware groups continue to target mid-sized technology and services firms, using double-extortion tactics that combine system encryption with the threat of public data leaks. In this landscape, listings on criminal leak sites have become a common signal that an organisation may have suffered an intrusion, even when independent confirmation remains limited.

On 2 January 2025, the ransomware group known as akira listed Go Strictly on its leak site, claiming to have exfiltrated internal files. The number of people affected is unknown, and public detail about the incident itself is limited. The listing matters because it places an IT-services provider under public claim of compromise, raising questions about the security of corporate records that such firms typically handle for clients and staff.

Breaking down the breach

According to the available record, Go Strictly was listed by the akira ransomware group on 2 January 2025. The group asserts that internal files were exfiltrated during a ransomware attack. No further public information has been released about the precise timing of the intrusion, the technical method used, the scale of systems affected, or whether encryption of operational systems also occurred. The number of individuals potentially impacted remains unknown. The only concrete claim attached to the listing is the group’s statement that it holds internal files and is prepared to publish them.

Because the information originates from a threat actor’s leak site, it must be treated as an unverified claim rather than independently confirmed fact. No official statement from Go Strictly detailing the incident appears in the public record accompanying this listing.

Who is akira?

Akira is a ransomware operation that became active in early 2023 and has since conducted double-extortion campaigns against organisations across multiple sectors. The group typically gains initial access through compromised credentials or vulnerable remote-access services, deploys ransomware to encrypt systems, and simultaneously exfiltrates data. Victims who do not pay are listed on a dedicated leak site where sample files or full archives are threatened with public release. Akira has previously targeted manufacturing, professional services, education and technology firms, often demanding multi-million-dollar ransoms. Its operators have shown a preference for Windows environments and have released decryptors only after payment or, in rare cases, after negotiation. The group’s public communications are limited to the leak-site posts themselves; it does not issue detailed press releases about individual victims beyond the data it claims to hold.

Who is Go Strictly?

Go Strictly is an information-technology services organisation whose stated purpose is to help customers make the most of their IT environments. This includes managing and modernising existing systems as well as assisting with the incorporation of new technologies. Firms of this type typically act as trusted intermediaries for client infrastructure, holding administrative credentials, configuration data, contractual records and operational documentation. Because they sit between multiple customer environments, a compromise at such a provider can create secondary risk for the organisations they support. The listing therefore carries weight not only for Go Strictly’s own employees and partners but also for any clients whose systems or data may have been accessible through the provider’s networks.

What data was at risk

The public record states that internal files were exfiltrated in a ransomware attack. On its leak site the group claims it is ready to upload “essentials corporate documents” that include financial data such as audits, payment details and reports; confidential licences; agreements and contracts; HR documents; and contact numbers and e-mail addresses of employees and customers. These categories are presented as the group’s assertion, not as independently verified contents of the stolen archive. Exact file counts, specific document titles and confirmation that every listed category was in fact taken remain undisclosed. Organisations in the IT-services sector commonly store precisely these kinds of records—employee directories, client contracts, financial statements and contact lists—so the claimed set is consistent with typical holdings, yet the precise contents of any exfiltrated material stay unconfirmed.

The real-world impact

If the claimed data were released, employees and customers whose contact details or personal records appear in HR files or client lists could face phishing, social-engineering attempts or identity-related fraud. Financial documents and payment details, if authentic, could be used to craft convincing invoice fraud or to map banking relationships. Contracts and licences might expose commercial terms that competitors or other adversaries could exploit. For Go Strictly itself, the listing creates reputational pressure, potential contractual disputes with clients, and the operational cost of forensic investigation and remediation—regardless of whether a ransom is paid. Because the number of affected individuals is unknown and the data set is unconfirmed, the concrete harm to any single person cannot yet be quantified; the risk remains real but currently unmeasured.

Were you affected?

Anyone who has worked for, contracted with, or supplied services to Go Strictly should treat the possibility of exposure seriously. Practical first steps include monitoring bank and credit accounts for unusual activity, enabling multi-factor authentication on email and other accounts, and remaining alert to unexpected messages that reference the company or its clients. Because public confirmation of specific personal records is still lacking, individuals can also run a free exposure scan of their email address against known breach data sets to check whether their information has already appeared in other incidents. If you receive notification from Go Strictly or a regulator, follow the guidance provided and consider placing a fraud alert with credit-reporting agencies. Continued monitoring remains the most reliable defence while further details, if any, emerge.

AICompiled with AI assistance from public sources and published under our editorial standards.